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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 In 1919 the War Chest, which centralized funding for a variety of domestic and 
international aid organizations, was reorganized as the Central Council for Social 
Services and Community Chest in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.  These organizations 
attempted to unite social work within the city but were controlled by executive boards 
that opposed centralized control over the numerous private philanthropic organizations.  
Dr. William Estes, of St. Lukes Hospital, attempted to lead the Central Council towards a 
more active role in identifying and treating social issues, but the fate of Bethlehem was 
left to those that held the wealth in the community.  As part of Estes desire to improve the 
city, Dr. Haven Emerson of New York City conducted a health study which found for a 
city with considerable wealth, mostly from Bethlehem Steel, Bethlehem was a generation 
behind in its approach to public health.
 2 
 
Introduction 
 
The history of social work in Bethlehem Pennsylvania has been largely 
overlooked in studies of the community that once contained the headquarters of one of 
the world’s steel producing giants.  World War I was a transformative event for 
Bethlehem.  Bethlehem Steel generated an immense amount of wealth through the 
production of munitions and war supplies sold to the allies.  While the rise in income 
lined the pockets of Bethlehem Steel executives the effects of industrialism transformed 
living conditions among workers in the community. 
In this time of crisis, there were people in Bethlehem that looked for solutions to 
the evolving problems in the community.  In his 1918 address to the members of city 
council and the citizens of Bethlehem, Mayor Archibald Johnston noted that “the 
municipal problem is primarily and essentially one of human welfare.”1  Johnston 
understood that the poor living conditions of South Bethlehem developed during the 
recent growth of Bethlehem Steel and that these new problems needed to be solved.  
More importantly, Johnston’s understanding of the complexity and severity of conditions 
in Bethlehem led him to the conclusion that Bethlehem’s journey to become a better city 
“could be made much easier and better through a wiser discharge of the functions of 
municipal government.”2  Johnston had a vision for the community that emphasized 
municipal control of city services that were previously left to private organizations.  He 
                                                            
1 Archibald Johsnton, “First Annual Message of Archibald Johnston, 1918.” Bethlehem Area 
Public Library, Accessed April 11, 2014. 
http://www.bapl.org/lochist/government/1918mrpt/1918mr01.htm 
2 Ibid 
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stated that public water, sewage, and garbage removal were services that should be under 
the strict control of city government.3 Johnston’s vision was a progressive one as he 
believed solutions to the city’s problems would come from the power of the government 
instead of privately held wealth. 
Johnston’s vision was never realized as the authority for social work fell to 
individuals outside the government.  In 1919 the creation of the Bethlehem Community 
Chest and Central Council for Social Services marked a change in social work in 
Bethlehem.  For the first time, leaders of the community attempted to participate in a 
larger national movement of Community Chest organizations that wanted to unify 
charitable giving in a community and educate the public on the needs of the community.   
It was not just the creation of Community Chest organizations on a national scale 
but changes in the very nature and philosophy behind social work that made the national 
movement so important.  Doctors and health professionals in New York and Philadelphia 
began looking at social problems and health issues on a community wide scale.  These 
individuals began to distinguish between the symptoms of deep social ills and their 
sources.  Only finding and addressing the sources of problems in a community would 
prevent the symptoms.  Charity work in the nineteenth century was often directed at 
using money to treat the symptoms of community problems.  Juvenile delinquency and 
homelessness were certainly important issues in the nineteenth century, but they were 
signs of deeper problems in American cities that remained unsolved.  Changes in the 
attitude of social work began in the medical community of New York City where doctors 
were implementing new health practices on community wide levels to fight the spread of 
                                                            
3 Ibid 
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disease.  Changes began in Philadelphia where organizations of professional social 
workers ensured the efficiency of smaller organizations.  Changes began in Chicago 
where philanthropists like John D. Rockefeller used their wealth to construct institutional 
change in communities.4 
By these measures social work in Bethlehem during the early twentieth century 
was not effective in improving the local community.  The Central Council for Social 
Services and the Community Chest used older ideas that linked social problems to 
deficiencies in character.  These organizations failed to bring an interest in social work to 
the community, and more importantly they failed to convince Bethlehem Steel executives 
that their accumulated wealth should be used to improve living conditions in Bethlehem.  
If anything, The Central Council and Community Chest became influenced by 
individuals associated with Bethlehem Steel to perpetuate older approaches to charity 
work.  It was along the banks of the Lehigh River that Bethlehem existed as a holdout 
against the progressive changes taking place in nearby New York and Philadelphia.  The 
Central Council and Community Chest were prime examples of how old methods of 
social work would not result in effective change 
The time period chosen for looking at the social work in Bethlehem was from 
1919-1930.  The beginning date was chosen because it was the year that the Central 
Council for Social Services and the Community Chest were created out of what remained 
of the Bethlehem War Chest.  The end of World War I combined with the massive 
amounts of wealth created by Bethlehem Steel gave authorities in Bethlehem an 
opportunity and the necessary resources to do meaningful social work.  The end date was 
                                                            
4 Lawrence J. Friedman, ed.Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 223-224. 
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chosen because of the beginnings of the Great Depression which created an 
unprecedented level of social problems.  In the first decade of their existence the Central 
Council and the Community Chest established their goals and proceeded with their plans, 
before the exceptional circumstances of the Great Depression intervened. 
 
The Origins of Social Work in Bethlehem 
The origins of the Central Council for Social Services and the Community Chest 
in Bethlehem can be traced back to the economic and social changes that occurred during 
the First World War.  While Bethlehem Steel was producing war materials for the allies, 
local chapters of national organizations were conducting charity work to help contribute 
towards the war effort as well as international relief.  Each of these organizations acted 
independently as they campaigned among the general public for funds and helped the war 
effort in their respective ways.  The Bethlehem Steel Company magazine said in a 1918 
issue that the “Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., [and] Knights of Columbus” had to perform 
separate funding campaigns and much of the work focused on relief for the people of 
Europe.5  In 1918 the Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce sought to unite the funding 
campaigns of all these separate organizations into one general campaign that would raise 
enough funds to provide for the work of each organization.  The patriotic language of the 
common campaign asked each citizen to pledge “of a certain amount to be given each 
month to help fill the chest.  Each person is expected to give as much as he possibly can, 
and arrangements will most likely be made to have the payments deducted from the 
salaries and wages of the employees, if they so desire.  The campaign will be a whirl-
                                                            
5 Bethlehem Steel. Volume 1, No. 1, May 1, 1918. 
http://www.bapl.org/lochist/business/booster01/no1booster02.html 
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wind affair, full of patriotism and pep.”6  The War Chest was a way to both inspire 
community donations and organize funding through one organization and significant 
portions of the funds were sent to aid people overseas. 
 As American soldiers returned home at the end of the war in November of 1918, 
the United States turned its attention back to concerns at home.  Likewise, organizations 
that benefited from the War Chest funding drives, like the Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., and 
Knights of Columbus, turned their attention from the events in Europe to the needs of 
Bethlehem citizens.  With the focus on the needs of the community the mission of the 
Bethlehem War Chest became obsolete and a group of Bethlehem citizens sought to 
apply the principles of the War Chest to a new organization that would conduct fund 
drives and distribute money to organizations that worked within Bethlehem.  This group 
of citizens would be the arbiters of charity work within Bethlehem with the War Chest as 
their model.  The reimagining of the Bethlehem War Chest resulted in the creation of not 
one, but two organizations that acted as oversight committees over social welfare in 
Bethlehem.  The Central Council for Social Services and the Community Chest were 
created as these oversight organizations.  Previously, philanthropic organizations had to 
conduct campaigns that relied on large contributions from a small pool of donors.  The 
Wiley House, which would later become the Children’s Home, was an example of an 
organization that received this type of donation, when it was given the considerable 
amount of $3,250 in 1911 by Bethlehem Steel President Charles M. Schwab for 
improvements to their building.7  The Community Chest and Central Council for Social 
                                                            
6 Ibid 
7 “History of Children’s Home.” Bethlehem Area Public Library. Local History Collection. Social 
Services Folder 
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Services were attempting to draw on a larger pool of donations, while big donors would 
only give once but hopefully very generously.  The Central Council and Community 
Chest initially focused on aiding the private agencies of the Red Cross, Associated 
Charities, Anti-Tuberculosis Foundation, Baby Health Station, Children’s Home, Day 
Nursery, Visiting Nurse Association, and St. Luke’s Hospital with the hopes that a central 
fundraising effort would aid these independent agencies.8 9 
 The transfer of oversight power from the War Chest to the Community Chest and 
Central Council was completed when the Community Chest accepted the $60,000 from 
the War Chest fund on December 1, 1919.  Board members of the War Chest had an 
advisory role through the end of 1919, but by the beginning of 1920 the Community 
Chest was functioning on its own.10  Much of the authority transferred to the Community 
Chest and Central Council seems to have been centered around Dr. William L. Estes, 
who was chosen as the first president of the Central Council because of his forty year 
experience at St. Lukes Hospital.  It seemed that many of the people involved in the 
Central Council and Community Chest put a great amount of faith in his experience. 
For a time these two separate organizations were run independently of one 
another with poorly defined sets of functions.  The language used at the founding of both 
organizations in 1919 was often vague.  At their first board meeting November 12, 1919 
                                                            
8 Central Council for Social Services. (Hereafter cited as CCSS) (1919, October 20) Meeting of 
the Executive Board. Bethlehem Area Public Library. Local History Collection. Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania. 
9 The October 20, 1919 minutes of the Central Council indicate that St. Lukes Hospital was 
receiving almost half of the funds available for distribution the following year. ($60,000 out of 
$129,460) 
Ibid. 
10 Community Chest. (Hereafter cited as CC) (1919, December 1- December 23) Meeting of the 
Executive Board. Bethlehem Area Public Library. Local History Collection. Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania. 
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the members of the Community Chest expressed what they thought was their purpose in 
the first action taken by the organization.  The members of the Community Chest 
appealed “to the Bethlehem War Chest Association to turn over the balances, funds, and 
pledges to the Treasurer of this association, to be used by them to carry on immediately 
and with the same policies and discretions so well exercised by the War Chest, the 
continued relief of the local non-sectarian organizations.”11  This limited view of the 
purpose of the Bethlehem Community Chest embodied the basic idea that the 
organization was a continuation of the efforts made by the War Chest.  Organizationally 
the Community Chest maintained much of the same structure throughout its history:  “A 
chairman or president presided over board meetings and administrative affairs.  Other 
officers included a vice-president (first and second), a treasurer (plus an assistant) and an 
executive secretary.  Several committees also made up the Chest, including executive, 
finance, by-laws, publicity, budget and campaign.”12  These officers and committees 
became the backbone of the organization and recipient agencies of the Community Chest 
could apply for membership pending approval by the Community Chest.  In order to join, 
agencies had to demonstrate that they “provided a necessary and unique service to the 
community.”13 
At first glance it would seem that the Community Chest was a sufficient catch-all 
organization for centralized fundraising in Bethlehem.  Like most Community Chest 
organizations in American cities at the time, the one in Bethlehem could have acted as a 
collection, distribution, and budget oversight organization, but the presence of the Central 
                                                            
11 CC. (1919, November 12) Meeting of the Executive Board. 
12 “Records of the United Way of Northampton and Warren Counties, 1918-1985.” Bethlehem 
Area Public Library. Local History Collection. 
13 Ibid 
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Council for Social Services made the purposes and the relationship between the two 
organizations much more complicated and uncertain.  The Community Chest was 
organized out of the old framework of the Bethlehem War Chest in 1919 and more 
formally laid out the purpose of the organization at its second meeting on November 17 
of that year.  At that meeting the board members of the Community Chest agreed that 
their official purpose was “to support recognized lawful community non-sectarian 
charitable, benevolent, and educational undertakings that give aid, relief and comfort to 
the people of Bethlehem and vicinity.”  They would achieve this by “increasing general 
knowledge...promoting public interest therein, and by donating of money and services 
thereto.”14  The Bethlehem Community Chest defined itself as a community organization 
that would use monetary donations to propagate charity work and stimulate the public’s 
interest in charity work in the city.  Furthermore, the Community Chest would gain the 
funds from “contributions from the public and from dues from members.”15  Because 
fundraising was one of the universal key aspects of a Community Chest, the Bethlehem 
Community Chest made it clear that it would be undertaking this activity.  Budget 
oversight of recipient organizations, which was another key aspect of the broader 
Community Chest movement, was not addressed by the board at that time. 
Although the Community Chest seemingly inherited the old War Chest 
framework, the minutes of the Central Council for Social Services revealed that it was in 
control of the social work movement in Bethlehem.  The Central Council for Social 
Services first met in 1919 with an express purpose of forming an independent 
Community Chest organization.  On October 14th the board of the Central Council listed 
                                                            
14 CC. (1919, November 17) Meeting of the Executive Board 
15 Ibid 
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the reasons that supported the creation of a Community Chest in Bethlehem.  It said that 
the Central Council for Social Services members “are in need of funds for continuing 
their work” and that “payments to these organizations under appropriations made by the 
Bethlehem War Chest Association have ceased with their fiscal year on July 1st, last.”16  
The Community Chest only existed because members of the Central Council ordered its 
formation out of necessity.  This created a loose affiliation between the Central Council 
and the Community Chest, although the Central Council had some initial control over the 
Community Chest.  In this way the Community Chest could be viewed as functioning 
like a large fundraising subcommittee of the Central Council for Social Services.  
Furthermore, the executive board of the Central Council called for a merger between the 
Central Council and the Community Chest which was unanimously approved by the 
Central Council and Community Chest by the end of 1923.17  If the Central Council held 
informal control of the Community Chest up to this point, the former had full legal 
authority over the Community Chest by the beginning of 1924. 
The authority of the Central Council for Social Services over the Community 
Chest and general social work was further established in the first days of the 
organizations when the Central Council assumed one of the main roles of the larger 
Community Chest movement in America.  On October 20, 1919 at a special meeting of 
the Central Council board, provisions were made for the organization to exercise 
budgetary control over the charity organizations of the community.  The Central Council 
called for information on the “[1920] budgets of the various organization members as 
well as their representative” that would report on the progress of their work to the 
                                                            
16 CCSS. (1919, October 14) Meeting of the Executive Board 
17 Ibid. (1919, October 9 – November 13) Meeting of the Executive Board 
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Community Chest.18  The gathering of this type of information was the first step in the 
Central Council becoming oversight committee for social services in Bethlehem.  
However, the separate functions of the Central Council and the Community Chest would 
not be well defined for several years.  For much of the first decade of their existence, 
these two organizations would serve overlapping and duplicate functions where it was 
very unclear where the functions of one organization ended and another began.  Members 
of the boards of the Central Council and Community Chest even had difficulty defining 
the responsibilities of their own respective organization. 
 
History of the Community Chest Movement in America 
Bethlehem in the 1920s was a microcosm of larger trends in wealth distribution 
occurring in America after World War I.  During the war, Bethlehem Steel sold 
munitions, battleship armor, and guns to European buyers that were in desperate need of 
these supplies to continue the war.  By the end of the war Bethlehem became the third 
largest industrial company in America, the second largest steel producer in America, and 
had increased company assets by $315 million.19  Eugene Grace, Bethlehem Steel’s 
President, also saw a significant increase in the money going into his pocket from the 
success of the plant.  Although Grace’s salary was only $12,000 before World War I “he 
received bonuses of $1,501,532 in 1917 and $1,386,193 in 1918” which was “probably 
the largest single wartime wage increase ever recorded in American history.”20  This 
                                                            
18 Ibid. (1919, October 14) Meeting of the Executive Board 
19 John K. Smith “Iron and Steel in the Lehigh Valley” Beyond Steel 
http://digital.lib.lehigh.edu/beyondsteel/business/steel/6/ 
20 Stuart Dean Brandis, Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America, (University Press of 
Kentucky, 1997), 182. 
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trend was occurring across America as concentrated wealth grew enormously in the early 
20th century.  In 1870 there were around one hundred millionaires in the United States.  
By 1916 that number grew to more than forty thousand and at least twenty were multi-
millionaires.21  This new wealth meant that leaders in cities had to rethink how to use that 
wealth to address social issues. 
While executives at Bethlehem Steel saw a dramatic increase in salaries and 
bonuses as a result of World War I, steelworkers in Bethlehem became part of another 
American trend at this time.  Blue-collar workers across America suffered from long 
hours, poor working conditions, and the realities of living in “squalid company towns.”22  
While employees of the new giants of industry suffered at work and at home some of the 
extremely wealthy felt the need to improve these conditions.  Even fewer of those 
holding the fortunes felt that the existing structure of charity work needed to be retooled 
to address social and health issues.  In her essay Curing Evils at Their Source, Judith 
Sealander said the few progressively minded rich Americans thought that “philanthropy 
should seek causes and cures.  It should find a remedy for a disease rather than build a 
hospital to treat its victims.  It should root out the reasons for poverty, not give alms to 
the impoverished.  It should expand knowledge and deal in new ideas, ones perhaps 
initially too risky for government officials or private organizations dependent on public 
approval to embrace.”23   
Eugene Grace and the executives at Bethlehem Steel did not subscribe to this new 
“scientific philanthropy.”  He gave his employees the limited benefits of welfare 
                                                            
21 Lawrence J. Friedman, ed. Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 218. 
22 Ibid, 218. 
23 Ibid, 219-221 
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capitalism, but left the matters of social work to the Central Council for Social Services 
and the Community Chest.  Bethlehem Steel had little, if any, involvement in either of 
these two organizations. In fact, the Central Council and Community Chest were 
probably seen by Grace as a buffer between his wealth and the needs of the community, 
even though he did give generously.  As Judith Sealander argues in her essay Curing 
Evils at Their Source, the wealthy that gave to charity often found the work draining and 
even bothersome as recipients could learn of their charity and begin to follow them 
searching for direct handouts.24  Instead the traditional distributive charities, like the 
Central Council and Community Chest, which constituted more than a third of the charity 
foundations in the United States in the early twentieth century were able to relieve men 
like Grace of their money and the inconvenience of philanthropy.25   
The Bethlehem Community Chest was part of movement in fundraising and 
distribution that started at the turn of the century in several American cities.  Although 
the Bethlehem Community Chest has its origins in World War I and the War Chest, this 
form of collective contributions began in Denver, Cleveland, and Cincinnati.  Denver is 
credited with the first American Community Chest in 1888, but this model fell short 
because it “never assumed responsibility for raising all the money needed by its 
constituent members, and, consequently, it could not promise its donors immunity from 
                                                            
24 It is likely that Eugene Grace gave directly to the Bethlehem Community Chest but if that is true 
he did so anonymously.  The Community Chest received a check from an anonymous donor for 
at least $25,000 each year from 1931-1933.  This money likely came directly from Grace or 
another Bethlehem Steel executive.  Grace had no direct involvement in decisions made by either 
the Community Chest or Central Council. 
CCSS. “Comparative Analysis of Contributions for Years 1928-1935.” Bethlehem Area Public 
Library. Local History Collection. Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. 
25 Friedman, Charity, 223 
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further solicitation in behalf of its member agencies.”26  The Bethlehem Community 
Chest more closely followed the Cleveland and Cincinnati models.   
While never fully following one model exactly, Bethlehem adopted an 
organization that could be considered a hybrid of the Community Chests established by 
these two cities.  Like Cincinnati, the Bethlehem Community Chest attempted to exercise 
total budgetary control of its recipient organizations.27  In his book, Trends in Social 
Work, Frank Bruno noted that total budgetary control was achieved through the 
“preparation of a total budget covering the anticipated needs of member agencies; the 
pledge on the part of the member agencies that they would not solicit money from 
anybody who contributed to the federal fund; and the use of unprecedented volunteers to 
solicit money from citizens in behalf of the agencies in the federation.”28  One large 
difference between the Cincinnati and Bethlehem variants on the Community Chest was 
that Cincinnati movement was begun and led by professional social workers.  Bethlehem 
relied heavily on the lay community to lead their Community Chest, and in this way the 
Bethlehem Community Chest more closely resembled the Cleveland experiments in 
charity work. 
Across the country the role of the Community Chest was seen as necessary, in 
addition to fundraising, because of the inefficiencies in the operation of charity agencies.  
By 1917 the proponents of Community Chest oversight work said that “the ways of 
[charity] agencies were chaotic and unbusinesslike; that the cost of collection of their 
                                                            
26 Frank J. Bruno, Trends in Social Work: 1874-1956 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1957), 199. 
27 Much of this control was exercised by the Central Council for Social Services through their role 
as an oversight organization in Bethlehem. 
28 Bruno, Trends in Social Work, 201 
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money was wasteful; and that the agencies were losing out in the race between expanding 
needs and the income possible under the appeal of the individual agencies.”29  However, 
not everyone was convinced that the Community Chest was the ideal way to organize 
social work in communities.   
Many of those that criticized Community Chests were professional social workers 
who saw flaws in this type of system.  As the Community Chest movement started to 
gain momentum in the first decade of the twentieth century, W. Frank Persons, of the 
New York Charity Organization Society, raised concerns about the negative effects of the 
Community Chest.  Persons believed that the oversight of a Community Chest would 
diminish the autonomy of the different charity agencies under its umbrella.  Persons’ 
second concern was that a Community Chest “would place the fate of social work in the 
hands of financial interests, whose major concerns would be to keep down costs and 
suppress troublesome movements.”30  Some of Persons’ contemporaries also believed 
that the movement would “promote mediocrity” by creating a standard of average care 
for communities instead of addressing the actual needs of a community. 
Countering these objections Frank Bruno in a 1956 book asserted that the 
Community Chest movement brought great contributions to the fields of social work in 
various communities.  Bruno said that “the chest has tapped new sources of contributions, 
especially in the phenomenally successful industrial fields.” 31  A Community Chest was 
able to appeal directly to larger corporations.  Although Community Chests were 
criticized as being influenced by the financial aspirations of its board of directors, Bruno 
                                                            
29 Ibid, 203 
30 Bruno, Trends in Social Work, 203 
31 Ibid, 204 
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felt that the financial “coercion that can be exercised through a complex agency such as 
the chest is less than can be exerted by the board of an independent agency.”  He believed 
that the complexities of the Chest would actually cut down on the ability of agency 
boards to take coercive action.32  Going further, Bruno argued that the greatest 
contribution the Community Chest made to community social work was through their 
distribution of funds.  The Community Chest acted as a financial oversight organization 
with budgetary control:  “By establishing budgetary control, it required each agency to 
budget its expenses, a practice that almost none of them had adopted before the coming 
of the chest.”  This was achieved through “a system of accounts on which the chest was 
able to base its assurance to givers that all money was honestly spent and accounted 
for.”33  This meant that the Community Chest was an organization that brought 
accountability to organizations that previously were not able to ensure their donors that 
the money was being put to useful projects.  The Community Chest of Bethlehem failed 
to live up to any of these benchmarks of success established by Bruno.  In fact, the 
Community Chest failed to support much needed social work in Bethlehem during the 
1920s. 
As the national Community Chest movement began to gain momentum, its 
advocates started to speak about what made its organizations and pledge campaigns 
successful.  On April 6, 1924 the New York Times published an article that tried to show 
the success of the Community Chest.  In regard to the effective operations of a 
Community Chest, it cited a 1922 report on “Central Financing of Social Agencies for the 
Executive Committee of the Columbus Advisory Council” by W. Frank Persons who was 
                                                            
32 Ibid, 205 
33 Ibid, 206 
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quoted saying that “No city should enter lightly upon the task of central financing nor 
should it enter upon it without a very careful study of the existing conditions.”  The 
report went on to say that “there must be a clear understanding of the purpose of central 
financing by the influential leaders of the community and no doubt or ignorance of the 
real purpose of the movement...There is risk in starting central financing when the social 
agencies are competitive, antagonistic, or separated by intense religious or social 
prejudices.”  Frank Persons understood what it took to make a Community Chest 
organization successful as he had studied Chests in Rochester, Philadelphia, Cleveland, 
and other communities.34 
 The New York Times article also addressed some concerns and criticisms of the 
Community Chest movement.  One of the criticisms of the Community Chest was that it 
was a way for wealthier members of the community to distance themselves from the any 
responsibility to charity.  In this way the Community Chest would put the financial 
burden of social work on a larger portion of the community that owned a smaller portion 
of the wealth.  The author of the article wanted to disprove this argument by showing that 
in fifty-four cities more than 50 per cent of the fund was raised from contributions of 
$100 and over and that in sixteen cities more than 70 per cent was so raised.  In thirteen 
cities over 40 per cent of the entire fund was made from pledges of $1,000 or more, and 
in twenty three cities from 25 to 40 percent of the total was made up from $1,000 
donations.”35  Further statistics were provided which indicated cities where contributions 
from small groups of people constituted about 50 percent of the total funding.36 
                                                            
34 “Community Chest Idea Gains Advocates Here” New York Times, April 6, 1924 
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
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Table 1 
City Population Number of 
Contributors to Chest 
Percent of total 
funding provided 
by contributors 
Philadelphia 1,922,788 440 46.4 
St. Louis 803,853 463 52.7 
Buffalo 536,718 385 50.5 
Rochester 317,867 157 47 
Louisville 257,671 206 46.2 
Springfield 144,227 455 61.5 
Chattanooga 57,895 428 58.6 
 
In these cities, as well as many others, the largest number of contributors came from a 
small number of wealthy individuals.  The article also used statistics from Community 
Chest campaigns to show how overall funding had increased.  The chart provided 
compared the “estimated number of contributors to charitable purposes before the 
organization of the chest with the actual number in the first chest campaign and in the 
most recent drive.”37 
 
Table 2 
City Pre Chest  
Contributors 
First Campaign 
Contributors 
Last Campaign 
Contributors 
Cleveland 4,800 143,531 200,179 
Dayton 1,500 24,000 35,000 
                                                            
37 Ibid 
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Detroit 3,000 52,000 144,313 
Harrisburg 1,100 11,000 13,305 
Parkersburg, W.V. 500 3,126 2,210 
Plainfield, N.J. 800 2,314 7,500 
Portland, Ore. 6,000 35,000 32,000 
    
In all of these cities the Community Chest organized effective community pledge drives 
where it increased, often drastically, the number of contributors from their first to most 
recent drive upon publication of this article in 1924.  In fact, Portland and Parkersburg 
were the only cities represented in this study where the number of contributors decreased 
from its first to last pledge drive.  The article recognized that while most contributions of 
large sums of money came from a relatively small number of individuals, the Community 
Chest was successful in increasing general public interest in funding charity and social 
work.38  Perhaps more importantly, this study also found that the Community Chest 
movement was fulfilling one of its most advertised functions.  In 145 campaigns, the cost 
of the campaign was ten percent or less of the total funds collected.  In 71 cases, the total 
cost was less than three percent of the total amount raised.  By the middle of the 1920s, 
Community Chest movements across the country were acting as efficient fundraising 
institutions for community social work. 
  
Implementation of a Community Chest in Bethlehem 
 In the midst of a larger national Community Chest movement, Bethlehem officials 
had to be careful to implement strategies that made good use of the Community Chest’s 
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capabilities while avoiding the pitfalls of this type of system.  The national Community 
Chest movement showed how these types of organizations could improve coordination 
among local charities, increase fundraising through a united effort, and use fundraising 
campaigns to educate the public on the needs of their community.   
What happened in Bethlehem after the founding of the Community Chest 
highlighted one of the greatest fears expressed by the public over the authority of a 
Community Chest organization.  There was concern among citizens that an organization 
that had budgetary control over charity groups and the power of centralized fundraising 
would abuse its power.  A letter written on April 19, 1920 that was sent to the 
Community Chest gave voice to the community’s opinion on the work being undertaken 
by the Central Council and Community Chest.  In this letter citizens R.M. Bird, E.W. 
Kries, E.A. Wheaton, and J.W. Critchlow state that Bethlehem residents who donated to 
the Community Chest and the community as a whole “view your organization with 
suspicion.”39   
The authors’ letter suggested that the Central Council and Community Chest 
would waste money in their own organizations instead of putting it to beneficial use in 
the community.  The letter reflected a general distrust in oversight organizations whether 
they were from the government or private citizens.  The authors wanted assurance that 
none of the money sent to the Community Chest would be used “for personal overhead 
service.  Particularly it is believed that no Secretary paid from these funds should be 
necessary.”40  Fear of misuse of money extended to where Community Chest funds 
would be used.  The letter requested that “the Board do not appropriate money from their 
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fund to other than the six charities specially named, save only as authorized by a two-
thirds vote of all subscribers.”41  
Along with concerns of the budgetary control exercised by the Community Chest, 
the authors of the letter understood that the decision making of the Community Chest 
occurred behind closed doors with little to no influence from the general public.  The 
authors saw the Community Chest operating similar to the old paternalism of nineteenth 
century philanthropy.  They demanded that “plans be laid for election by the subscribers 
of the next year’s Board, with an advisory committee consisting of representatives 
elected or appointed by all Churches, Fraternal Organizations, Business Organizations, 
Municipal and Social Bodies, and every Club and Organization having direct or indirect 
interest in these charities.”42  This call for transparency of process and the inclusion of the 
larger community in decisions made by the Community Chest was the most significant 
critique of its operation. 
On January 15, 1923 the Community Chest adopted the suggestions made by the 
authors of the 1920 letter in regard to the transparency of its organization.  The executive 
board of the Community Chest determined that ballots were to be printed in the local 
newspapers where the general public could elect twenty one members of the board to 
serve for the year.  Unfortunately, public participation in the oversight decisions did not 
last long.  The election the following year saw a significant decrease in the public’s 
interest in the Community Chest.  In this election the Community Chest sent 5,248 ballots 
directly to people that donated money and more than 87 percent of those ballots were not 
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returned.43  It is likely that these statistics pointed to a trend in the community.  The large 
number of unreturned ballots probably reflected a general disinterest among Bethlehem 
citizens in a Community Chest that they did not see as effecting meaningful change in 
their community. 
Ultimately, the Community Chest fundraising efforts were largely controlled by a 
small group of wealthy Bethlehem residents.  They in turn determined what problems 
were addressed in Bethlehem and how the Community Chest functioned.  An important 
disconnect between the perceived and actual needs of the community emerged as the 
Community Chest in Bethlehem based its work on an outdated model of philanthropy 
where wealthy, untrained private citizens ran social work for the community. 
Much of the work conducted by the Community Chest and Central Council 
reflected the philosophy that character improvement was the key to social progress.  For 
example, the Central Council dedicated significant time and energy to understanding 
juvenile delinquency.  In 1926 the Central Council board members brought up the “boy 
problem” and the “girl problem.”  Juvenile delinquency as a source of social problems 
had been popularized earlier by Jane Addams and her contemporaries in their social work 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.44  The social workers of the 1920s 
and 30s saw juvenile delinquency as a symptom, not a cause, of an unhealthy community.  
Investigations into character building agencies began in January, 1926 when the 
Central Council assessed the ability of the Girls Club and Campfire Girls to fight the “girl 
problem.”  Similar inquiries were made by the Rotary and Lions clubs into the state of 
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juvenile delinquency among boys in Bethlehem.45  Efforts to fight juvenile delinquency 
continued into 1927 as the Central Council continued to investigate the issue and also 
assisted with the establishment of a local chapter of the YWCA.  In January, 1927 the 
Central Council organized a special committee “to consider the needs of the community 
as to recreational and character building agencies.”46  In July of the same year this 
committee reported that preliminary work on establishing a YWCA had been completed 
with the suggested purpose that it be used to work with the “industrial girl.”47   
Keeping children off of the streets became a major goal for the Central Council in 
the late 1920s and seemingly took over the purpose of the organization.  Much to the 
approval of the Central Council, the Salvation Army and the YWCA reported in October, 
1927 that their work among young people was “growing rapidly” especially with the Girl 
Scouts and Campfire Girls.48  More disturbingly, existing social problems in Bethlehem 
were being looked at purely from the point of view of increasing juvenile delinquency.  
At a meeting on January 10, 1928, Mrs. Kift of the executive board reported that many 
children turned to life on the streets of Bethlehem because of mothers that insist “on 
working in a factory although her contribution to the family’s finances is no more 
needed.”49  It is unclear how Mrs. Kift came to this conclusion, but it is probable she 
misunderstood the motivations of workers in Bethlehem. 
Caring for the needs of children in Bethlehem was no doubt important but Mrs. 
Kift and other members on Central Council failed to address the causes of social distress 
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in the community and insisted on treating the symptoms.  By 1930 the Central Council 
had shifted its focus almost entirely to the issue of juvenile delinquency.  Members of the 
council continued to ask for increased work among young boys and girls and entire 
meetings were being dedicated to discussions of the “leisure time for girls and boys.”  
The Central Council, which began with a mission of improving the efficiency of social 
work in Bethlehem, had resigned itself to proclaiming that “every public dance should be 
chaperoned,” in September of 1930 even as the effects of the depression were hitting 
Bethlehem. 50 
Even before the onset of the Great Depression, The Central Council continuously 
ignored reports of other problems in the community while they focused on juvenile 
delinquency.  A report on the state of health in Bethlehem in 1925 seems to have scared 
the executive board of the Central Council into forming exploratory committees to 
investigate a few of these matters.  Because many of the committees accomplished very 
little if anything at all, it stands to reason that these health issues weren’t taken very 
seriously.  In 1926 the Central Council created committees to explore the extent to which 
blindness, elderly dependence, and poor dental health existed in the community, but none 
of these continued beyond a few months.51  Even the more progressively minded of 
Bethlehem’s elites were limited in the implementation of social work. 
 
Dr. William Estes and the Social Services Exchange 
The Central Council’s first president was Dr. William L. Estes who had been 
Superintendent and Chief of Staff at Bethlehem’s St. Lukes Hospital from 1881 to 1920. 
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He advocated giving control of social work to trained professionals instead of the wealthy 
elite.  Estes was born on November 28, 1855 in Western Tennessee to a rich planter 
family.52  He attended Bethel College in Kentucky before starting medical school at the 
University of Virginia in 1874.  After leaving the University of Virginia, Estes travelled 
to New York City to continue his medical education at the University of the City of New 
York Medical Department.53  He also spent time working as a practicing surgeon at Mt. 
Sinai hospital in New York in the late 1870s where he learned new methods in hospital 
and patient cleanliness.  Many of these new practices would become standard 
procedure.54  While in New York, Estes was invited to take an open position in South 
Bethlehem as the Medical Superintendent of St. Lukes Hospital.  At the time the 
Bethlehem Iron Co., several manufacturing plants, and four major railroads generated 
numerous industrial casualties.  The nearest hospitals were in Wilkes-Barre, Philadelphia, 
and New York.  St. Lukes Hospital was in dire need of expanding and needed a skilled 
superintendent to oversee the growth.  Estes admitted the “temptation to accept the job 
was fairly overpowering but I was still loathe to give up my New York City practice with 
all its possibilities.”55 
Estes finally accepted the position and arrived in South Bethlehem on November 
1, 1881.  He was very excited to put his skills as an experienced surgeon to good use as 
well as the new practices in disease prevention and theories of bacterial infection that 
were gaining popularity at this time but were not yet widespread in the medical field.56  
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Under the leadership of Estes, St. Lukes Hospital grew into an institution that could better 
accommodate the rapidly expanding Lehigh Valley industries.  His skill as an organizer 
and his vision for public health certainly made Estes an ideal candidate for the President 
of the Central Council for Social Services, but many of Estes plans faced stubborn 
opposition.   
Estes’ commitment to improving community health and awareness in Bethlehem 
was part of larger trends that linked social issues with health concerns.  As early as 1881, 
Dr. James Knight of the New York Society for the Ruptured and Crippled in New York 
City said that “disease and physical injury are symptoms, but they are, as well, primary 
factors in the causation of dependency.”57  Social scientists believed that blaming public 
health and social problems on older notions of bad character were unproductive.  By 
getting involved with the Central Council for Social Services, Estes was participating in 
the growing paradigm of the medical field in the early twentieth century that linked the 
social issues of poverty, delinquency, and unemployment to the poor health conditions 
and physical dangers of the expanding industrial American city.  These ideas were not 
isolated within the medical community as medical studies linking disease to poverty 
levels became publicly available.  In 1919 studies conducted by the United States Public 
Health Service showed that “illness occurred nearly four times as often in the lowest 
income group as in the highest.”58  These studies not only showed deficiencies in the care 
available to people in low income groups and the health dangers of industrial cities, but it 
also showed that attitudes about the process of social work needed to change to be able to 
address the sources of social problems.  These were developments Estes would have 
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understood and seen how they should have influenced the purpose of the Social Council 
for Social Services. 
Unfortunately for Estes, the executive board of the Central Council for Social 
Services could not effectively direct social work in Bethlehem because it could not even 
agree on the purpose of the organization.  Early on the Central Council executive board 
had set aside their normal work to ask themselves what it was they were supposed to do.  
In early 1922, after two years of acting as an oversight organization for Bethlehem’s 
social work organizations, the board engaged in several “general discussions...as to the 
functions of the Central Council for Social Services.”  On February 14, 1922 the board 
ordered Estes to “draw up a detailed report as to the functions of the organization…with 
the idea of adopting it.”59  
The board request gave Estes the opportunity to address the shortcomings of the 
Central Council and express his own personal frustration with the ineffectiveness of the 
organization.  Estes began his address by explaining that the original intent of the 
organization and its existing statement of purpose should still direct the efforts of the 
Central Council.  Estes said that, “in order to coordinate work, prevent duplications, and 
make the work more efficient, it was decided by the citizens a few years ago to organize a 
central control for all these associations.”60  For Estes, the Central Council still had a very 
important role to make sure that each recipient organization operated as efficiently as 
possible in the larger social work community.  The Central Council made provisions for 
representatives from the client agencies to become members of the board of executives 
although many only attended meetings when summoned by the Central Council or to 
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protest cuts in funding.  The impact of an individual agency on the overall community 
was minimal but the potential of addressing, and perhaps fixing, social issues with a 
united effort was too important to ignore.  To this end Estes included in his address a 
condemnation of the shortsightedness of agencies created with very limited objectives.  
He believed that the Central Council could bring about changes in the community as a 
whole while “it is presumed that [the Bethlehem Steel Safety and Welfare Department] 
concerns itself solely with the families of the employees of Bethlehem Steel.”61  Estes 
wanted the Central Council to bring the efforts of various organizations together to better 
the community as a whole.  
While Estes faced immense challenges with the inability of the Central Council to 
overcome the agendas of individual organizations, he also faced staunch opposition 
within the Central Council to his vision of the Central Council as an agency insuring 
efficient charity work.  This debate centered on the formation of a Social Service 
Confidential Exchange.  The Social Service Exchange was something Estes saw as 
central to the purpose of the Central Council since it first appeared in board minutes in 
October 1920.  At that time the idea was accompanied by “an animated discussion.”62  
Still, Estes continued to advocate for the creation of an exchange to increase coordination 
amongst charity organizations and spent much of November and December emphasizing 
its importance to his board.  At one meeting Estes declared that “the idea of the Central 
Council was not only to prevent overlapping, but also to avoid delay in relief.”63  The 
Confidential Exchange would act as a clearinghouse where patient and recipient 
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information could be stored to ensure the effectiveness of social work.  Estes also 
understood that charity organizations served overlapping functions.  To ensure that the 
work of each organization was maximized, he wanted the Central Council to have a 
mechanism by which they could be certain that there were not individuals, or families, 
receiving aid from multiple organizations for the same services.  That way the Central 
Council could be positive their resources were being used wisely and efficiently. 
Opposition to the idea of the Social Services Confidential Exchange was 
spearheaded by Dr. Harry Maas Ullman, who was a Professor at Lehigh University in the 
Chemistry Department and a prominent figure in Bethlehem.  Ullman’s research was 
relevant to the work of Bethlehem Steel and his membership at Saucon Valley Country 
Club meant he was familiar with Bethlehem Steel executives and their thoughts on the 
community.64   
Although the first time Ullman’s objections to establishing a Confidential 
Exchange made it into the official minutes was on December 12, 1920, he was probably 
involved in discussions of the idea previously.  Ullman believed that “there was very 
little overlapping of work in Bethlehem.”  Furthermore, he believed that “the money it 
would take to pay a Secretary” to operate the exchange “could be more wisely spent by 
giving it to the Day Nursery.”65  
The difference in these views was again displayed in 1921 when Estes was able to 
gain enough support from members of the Central Council to establish the Confidential 
Exchange.  On January 1, 1921 in an effort to increase coordination between the social 
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work agencies, Estes got approval from the Central Council board to establish a card 
index system to record people and families receiving aid from Central Council client 
organizations as well as all money appropriated from the Community Chest to cover the 
expenses of such actions.66  At this point Ullman removed himself from the activities of 
the Central Council.  He never returned to council meetings in any kind of leadership role 
and as a last act he penned a letter to the Central Council explaining his opposition to the 
efforts made by Estes to establish the Confidential Exchange.67 
Despite Estes’ best efforts, the board of the Central Council always saw the 
Exchange as a project that diluted the resources available to provide to other agencies.  
Although Estes gained approval for establishing a Confidential Exchange in 1921, it 
would be several years before the funds could be gathered to set up what would become 
the known as the Social Services Exchange.  Problems persisted as the ideas of spending 
money to ensure organizational efficiency and providing direct monetary contributions to 
charity organizations continued to compete.  The Central Council board supported the 
Social Services Exchange with little enthusiasm and even less financial support.  In 
October 1924, Mr. H.W. Kessler, who had been appointed to run the Exchange, 
attempted to resign as it was not “operating to his satisfaction.”68  The struggles 
continued as Estes spent years attempting to convince the board of the importance of 
accountability and efficiency in social work until October 1927 when the battle was lost.  
On October 11, the Central Council and Community Chest determined that “the results 
obtained do not justify the expenditure necessary to employ a paid secretary” and that the 
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Social Services Exchange would be discontinued.69 
 
Dr. Haven Emerson’s Health Study 
If Estes could not improve the efficiency of social work in Bethlehem he could try 
to improve what he considered to be the unsatisfactory state of public health in the 
community.  The lack of impact that the Community Chest and Central Council for 
Social Services had on the Bethlehem community was seen in their response to a study 
done in 1925.  The City of Bethlehem, Community Chest, Lehigh University, Bethlehem 
Steel, and several independent contributors commissioned Dr. Haven Emerson of New 
York City to conduct a study and produce a report on “the health and hospital services of 
Bethlehem, based on a survey of conditions during the Spring and Summer of 1925.”70  It 
is unlikely that the any of these organizations proactively sought out Dr. Emerson.  It is 
more likely that Estes contacted Emerson for this study since Estes’ real expertise was in 
medicine and he valued the opinions of professionals in community health.  Dr. Haven 
Emerson was a well-known progressive who had been appointed Deputy Commissioner 
of New York City’s Health Department in 1914.  Before Emerson arrived at the Health 
Department it had already gained fame as being at the forefront of implementing medical 
science in the realm of public health.  Emerson greatly expanded the Health Department 
through extensive studies on heart disease, diabetes, and what happened to discharged 
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patients when they left the hospitals.71  Emerson’s expertise in public health was what 
Bethlehem desperately needed. 
Emerson’s conclusions about the state of Bethlehem showed his surprise that a 
city that contained so much wealth would struggle so much with public health.  He found 
that the “general situation is that of a community with ample means and without serious 
financial burdens which has either ignored or been wholly unaware of the possibility of 
public service through a competent and professionally directed health bureau, which most 
other cities of similar size in the United States have learned to require and trust.”72  The 
absence of a public health department in Bethlehem would not change unless the people 
that held a majority of the wealth in the community were convinced that such work was 
necessary. 
Bethlehem did have a Bureau of Health but it lacked “responsibility, supervision, 
adequate records or enforcement of state and local sanitary law.”  In fact the Bureau of 
Health was run by the City Clerk who did not have the education or authority to speak on 
medical matters.  Worse yet, the Bureau of Health had a total budget of $13,480 in 1924,  
82.3% of which was spent on salaries.73  The remaining funds went to smaller health 
activities like school health services or the Baby Milk Station, which was established in 
1916 to help provide safe and cheap milk to families.74 
Perhaps the most alarming of Emerson’s claims was that Bethlehem was totally 
unprepared to deal with communicable diseases.  At the time some vaccinations were 
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becoming available through state health services but vaccines for some diseases like 
smallpox were the responsibility of local government. Emerson found that no records 
existed of the number of children vaccinated in Bethlehem which was a requirement for 
children attending schools.  At St. Lukes Hospital, “the only facilities for hospital care of 
communicable diseases are the 8 beds in the isolation pavilion at St. Luke’s Hospital.”  
He recommended that thirty beds were needed and doctors make them available for those 
in the poor neighborhoods of Bethlehem where communicable disease would most likely 
be found.75   
Emerson found the lack of tuberculosis prevention and awareness nothing short of 
shocking.  He put it bluntly when he said that “no attention is paid to tuberculosis by the 
city Health Bureau” and that “the officers of the city have no information as to 
tuberculosis and its prevention, the most important health problem of the community.”76  
There was also no effort to contain the spreading of tuberculosis in Bethlehem.  Health 
professionals and hospital staff did not keep track of where patients with tuberculosis 
lived.  Patients were also found with “teeth and mouths in a shocking and diseased 
condition” and doctors failed to report cases of tuberculosis to the state as required by 
law.77 
 As in case with the treatment of tuberculosis Emerson found many things wrong 
with the approach of city officials towards health.  Unlike many of the directors of the 
Community Chest and the Central Council for Social Services, he recognized the living 
conditions that resulted in the poverty and disease.  In fact, Emerson found that most 
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activities carried out by health officials in Bethlehem did little to contribute to disease 
prevention:  “Disposal of human excreta, the control of fly breeding...and the control of 
mosquito breeding” were the only activities that went directly to disease prevention.  He 
found that many of the activities and regulations that would improve health conditions 
were absent:  “There is lacking an ordinance requiring connection with the sewer when 
accessible from premises” and that Bethlehem had “no housing inspection”, “housing 
code”, “zoning ordinance”, and “no smoke ordinance and no attention is paid to the very 
considerable pollution of the air from railroad and industrial sources.”78 
 Dr. Emerson’s conclusions about the poor state of public health in Bethlehem 
required aggressive action to be taken, action which was not being initiated by the 
Community Chest or the Central Council for Social Services.  In conclusion, Emerson 
stated that “Bethlehem is at least a generation behind the better American municipalities 
of its size, wealth, and intelligence, in its health work.”79  
Emerson’s suggested course of action for Bethlehem was one that involved little 
to no involvement of the Community Chest or Central Council for Social Services.  In 
fact, Dr. Emerson does not even mention either organization in his proposed remedies for 
the community.  There were two things that Emerson believed would drastically improve 
public health in Bethlehem.  First, he wanted Bethlehem to employee a “full time trained 
medical health officer” as none existed at the time.80  Emerson’s second recommendation 
downplayed the position of the Community Chest and Central Council for Social 
Services.  He wanted Bethlehem to establish a “Council or Central Committee” that 
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would regulate community health and hospital care.  Emerson envisioned that 
membership on this committee would come from local private and public health 
agencies.  This committee would be free of the financial oversight power held by the 
Central Council for Social Services and would focus on community health issues.81  He 
did not mention a source of funding for this committee, but seeing as it incorporated 
public health agencies it is likely that it would have fallen within the control of local 
government.  It is probable that Dr. Emerson’s proposals were seen as a challenge to the 
power exercised by directors of the Community Chest and Central Council for Social 
Services.  Dr. Emerson’s study was noted as read in the board minutes of the Central 
Council before being tossed aside.   
An important and apparent disconnect existed between the real experienced 
problems of Bethlehem and the problems as seen by the executive board of the Central 
Council for Social Services.  The former were realized by many of those outside the 
Central Council including health professionals, social workers, and the residents of 
Bethlehem.  The latter were a reflection of what those in positions of authority in 
Bethlehem believed to be the root of social problems in the community.  Emerson’s 
report on the inability of Bethlehem officials to take communicable diseases seriously 
and the lack of interest or ability to record, much less improve, living conditions in the 
city was read by the board of the Central Council and dismissed just as quickly.  On 
January 1, 1926 in his Secretary Report to the Central Council, F.J. Wilt stated that 
Emerson’s “suggestions will probably occupy our attention for some time to come.”82  
This was the first and last mention of Emerson’s report by any member of the Central 
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Council executive board.  The issue of treating advanced stages of tuberculosis, which 
was one of Dr. Emerson’s major concerns about the state of public health in Bethlehem, 
was raised in early 1930 but the Central Council decided to push the issue to the County 
Commissioners office.83 
 
Conclusion 
 
Dr. Emerson’s recommendations for the community echoed the vision of Mayor 
Archibald Johnston for the community in 1918.  Both Emerson and Johnston advocated 
for a larger role of government in improving public welfare and health in Bethlehem.  
They both understood that improvements would come from the power of local 
government and public health professionals instead of the private activities of prominent 
citizens. In his 1922 annual report Johnston acknowledged that “as the population of a 
city grows, the demands for increased facilities likewise grow, and largely for this 
reason...it costs more to operate cities as they grow in size and the population 
increases.”84  He argued that Bethlehem could have drastically improved schools, 
sanitation, and police and fire protection if the city would be willing to submit to 
increased taxation to pay for such services.  Ultimately, Johnston’s appeal fell on deaf 
ears as the citizens of Bethlehem were largely content with the improvements the wealthy 
were willing to pay for.   
During this time Bethlehem Steel put modest resources into improving the lives of 
their workers, but showed little interest in the living conditions or public health of the 
larger community.  This attitude most likely reflected the views of company president 
                                                            
83 Ibid. (1930, February 11) Meeting of the Executive Board 
84 Archibald Johnston “1922 Mayor’s Report.” Bethlehem Area Public Library. Local History 
Collection.  
 37 
Eugene Grace.  
The Central Council for Social Services reflected models of philanthropy that the 
wealthy knew and understood.   This approach did not solve the numerous problems in 
Bethlehem in spite of the money donated by the wealthy.  Some private citizens did make 
large monetary contributions towards charity organizations in Bethlehem, but the 
disinterest of people like Grace made it clear that leaving matters of public health to 
private citizens was not enough to create the necessary improvements.  Health problems 
persisted and could have only been solved through a larger role in government as 
suggested by both Dr. Haven Emerson and Mayor Archibald Johnston. 
The city was handcuffed by a number of factors that prevented any of the needs of 
its citizens from being effectively addressed.  Johnston advocated for an increased role in 
government action but this was difficult in a city that resisted the higher levels of taxation 
necessary for such work.  Furthermore, Johnston was stonewalled by Bethlehem Steel 
which resisted tapping the huge amount of wealth generated by the company to provide 
for improvements in the city.  It remains unclear why this was so, but it was likely a 
reflection of Grace’s attitude towards the role of the company in the community. 
Despite the best efforts of Estes the Central Council failed to become a source of 
coordination between the various social welfare organizations in Bethlehem.  The Social 
Services Exchange and the health study conducted by Emerson did not result in the 
changes Estes hoped to see.  While his vision for the Central Council and the public 
health of the city did not take hold, Estes remained a progressive in a city that chose to 
leave social welfare to the efforts of individuals and private organizations. 
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Epilogue 
Despite the self imposed authority of the Central Council and the Community 
Chest they would not last as the oversight organizations in Bethlehem.  However, their 
models of charity oversight would be incorporated into future methods of carrying out 
social work in the community.  After fifty years of work in the city of Bethlehem the 
Community Chest changed their name to the Greater Bethlehem Area United Fund in 
1970 shortly before merging with the Forks of the Delaware United Fund to create a 
larger regional organization.  The Central Council for Social Services went through 
several name changes before being absorbed “into a valley-wide planning agency that 
included the Northampton and Lehigh County Councils” in 1963.85  Both the Central 
Council and the Community Chest would eventually become part of the operations of the 
United Way in the Lehigh Valley.   
The United Way continued many of the methods of the Central Council and 
Community Chest.  The United Way then implemented models of philanthropy on a 
larger scale that failed to acknowledge many of the real social ills of their time.  
Establishing a larger pool of fundraising and using budgetary oversight to control 
spending were still common practices, but the United Way was able to evolve in many 
ways that the Central Council and Community Chest could not.  In many ways the 
modern United Way of the Lehigh Valley became an embodiment of what Dr. Estes 
wanted for the Central Council for Social Services.  Social service professionals were 
incorporated into the United Way to help make oversight determinations about the 
funding of organizations.  Despite this, many of the problems that went unaddressed by 
                                                            
85 “Records of the United Way of Northampton and Warren Counties, 1918-1985.” Bethlehem 
Area Public Library. Local History Collection, 1-2. 
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the Central Council and the Community Chest lingered for decades in the United Way.  It 
wasn’t until the early 2000s that the United Way of the Lehigh Valley reevaluated their 
funding plan to try and identify the problems in the community and direct their giving to 
combat those issues.86  This recent change in the mission of the United Way of the 
Lehigh Valley focused on local primary education which in part highlighted the how 
limited the influence of the United Way was.  The new focus took significant funding 
from other areas of education and broader categories of charitable organizations. 
The shortcomings of the Central Council for Social Services and the Community 
Chest in the 1920s served as prime examples of the danger of similar models of 
organizational funding and oversight that still exist today.  Even though some of the 
social problems changed in the decades since the founding of these organizations, local 
communities still need to come to terms with the structure of community power and what 
voices decide the hierarchy of worthwhile issues.  Determinations on the causes of social 
problems and the way people understand community ills have come a long way since Dr. 
Emerson’s 1925 study of Bethlehem.  But as Bethlehem continues to struggle with the 
competing voices of those who hold the wealth and local residents, the lessons of the 
Central Council for Social Services and the Community Chest remain close to home.  
By the 1920s Bethlehem was a community driven by the success of Bethlehem Steel.  It 
was a corporate city that had a concentration of wealth in the hands of a few executives in 
the community.  With the power tilted so drastically towards these few individuals it 
would have made sense for Bethlehem Steel to take an interest in improving the local 
                                                            
86 Sam Kennedy, “New United Way Funding Formula Shifts Money to Select City Schools,” The 
Morning Call, March 29, 2014, accessed March 30, 2014, http://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-
united-way-changes-investment-plan-20140328,0,1572909.story?page=1 
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community.  The reality of Bethlehem was quite the opposite.  Bethlehem in the 1920s 
was dominated by vice, disease, and poor working and living conditions but there were 
few in Bethlehem that believed city government should take a more progressive approach 
and a stronger role in local relief.  
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